Amazon AWS Certified Security — Speciality SCS-C02 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Questions Set 15 Q211-225 - Certbolt

Visit here for our full Amazon AWS Certified Security — Specialty SCS-C02 exam dumps and practice test questions.

Question211:

A global retail company needs to securely store and share sensitive business analytics data in Amazon S3 across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, access control based on least privilege, temporary external auditor access, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized auditing across regions. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Share S3 objects via public URLs with email notifications for access tracking.
B) Enable S3 encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, enforce bucket policies to deny public access, provide pre-signed URLs for auditors with expiration, enable CloudTrail logging across regions, and implement AWS Config rules for compliance monitoring.
C) Encrypt files manually, transfer via FTP, and review logs monthly.
D) Use default S3 encryption and assign permanent IAM credentials to auditors.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insecure and non-compliant. Public URLs risk exposure to unauthorized access and malicious exploitation. Email notifications are insufficient for auditing purposes and cannot ensure regulatory compliance, as they do not provide centralized, immutable logs. Preventive controls such as strong encryption and strict access enforcement are absent, violating requirements for frameworks like PCI DSS, SOC 2, and GDPR.

Option B is a robust, enterprise-ready solution. Customer-managed KMS keys provide centralized encryption management, including rotation and detailed audit logging. Bucket policies prevent public access, enforcing preventive measures. Pre-signed URLs allow temporary access to auditors, supporting least-privilege principles. CloudTrail logs all S3 operations across regions, creating a centralized, immutable audit trail. AWS Config continuously monitors bucket configurations, detecting deviations from compliance policies and triggering alerts or automated remediation. This architecture implements preventive (encryption and access policies), detective (CloudTrail and Config monitoring), and corrective (automated alerts and remediation) controls, ensuring secure, compliant, and auditable data sharing.

Option C, manual encryption and FTP transfer with monthly log reviews, is operationally inefficient, error-prone, and reactive. It fails regulatory requirements for real-time monitoring and centralized control. Option D, default encryption with permanent IAM credentials, is risky because permanent credentials may be misused, and there is no automation or temporary access enforcement, making it unsuitable for sensitive data handling.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-account, sensitive analytics data storage and sharing in Amazon S3.

Question212:

A healthcare organization is deploying Amazon RDS databases containing patient health information across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, MFA enforcement for administrative access, centralized credential rotation, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized logging. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Enable RDS encryption with AWS-managed keys and assign static IAM credentials to administrators.
B) Enable RDS encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, require IAM database authentication with MFA, automate credential rotation using AWS Secrets Manager, enable CloudTrail logging, and implement AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Store credentials in application code and review logs monthly.
D) Enable default encryption and rely on manual rotation with local logs.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A lacks sufficient security and compliance. AWS-managed keys do not allow granular control over key rotation and auditing. Static IAM credentials are susceptible to compromise, sharing, or accidental exposure. MFA is not enforced, reducing authentication security. Logging and monitoring are limited, failing HIPAA, SOC 2, and other regulatory requirements.

Option B provides a comprehensive, enterprise-ready solution. Customer-managed KMS keys offer centralized control over encryption, including rotation, audit logging, and key policies. IAM database authentication with MFA enforces strong authentication and least-privilege access. AWS Secrets Manager automates credential rotation, reducing operational errors and exposure risks. CloudTrail logs all RDS operations for centralized auditing and forensic analysis. AWS Config continuously monitors database configurations for compliance violations, triggering alerts or automated remediation when necessary. Preventive (encryption, MFA, least-privilege access), detective (CloudTrail, Config), and corrective (rotation, alerts) controls ensure secure, compliant, and auditable RDS operations.

Option C, storing credentials in application code with monthly log reviews, is highly insecure and operationally inefficient. Option D, default encryption with manual rotation and local logs, is error-prone, non-compliant, and lacks automated monitoring.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for sensitive healthcare data in multi-account Amazon RDS deployments.

Question213:

A multinational company requires secure communication between Amazon ECS services deployed across multiple VPCs and AWS regions. Requirements include encryption in transit, mutual authentication, prevention of unauthorized access, and centralized logging for auditing and compliance. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Configure manual IPsec tunnels over the public Internet between services.
B) Use AWS PrivateLink for cross-VPC and cross-region communication, enforce TLS with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs, and log network traffic with VPC Flow Logs and API activity with CloudTrail.
C) Use direct IP connectivity without encryption and review traffic periodically.
D) Allow VPC peering without additional security controls.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, manual IPsec tunnels, is operationally complex and error-prone. Key management and rotation across multiple regions are challenging, increasing the risk of misconfigurations and unauthorized access. Auditing is limited and reactive, failing compliance requirements. Scaling IPsec tunnels globally is operationally infeasible.

Option B provides a secure, scalable, and enterprise-ready architecture. AWS PrivateLink enables private, secure connectivity without exposure to the public Internet. TLS ensures data confidentiality in transit. Mutual TLS using ACM Private CAs validates both client and server identities, preventing unauthorized access. VPC Flow Logs capture metadata about network traffic for centralized monitoring. CloudTrail records API activity, enabling auditing, incident investigation, and compliance reporting. Preventive (PrivateLink, TLS, mutual authentication), detective (VPC Flow Logs, CloudTrail), and corrective (alerts, automated remediation) controls ensure operational security, compliance, and auditable communication.

Option C, direct connectivity without encryption, is insecure, noncompliant, and fails to provide auditable access controls. Option D, VPC peering without additional security controls, allows connectivity but lacks encryption, authentication, and centralized monitoring, exposing services to potential threats.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-region ECS service communication.

Question214:

A healthcare organization is deploying AWS Lambda functions to process sensitive patient data. Requirements include preventing unauthorized invocations, restricting triggers to authorized API Gateway endpoints, and auditing all invocations. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Allow all IAM users to invoke Lambda and rely on CloudTrail logs.
B) Apply resource-based policies to Lambda functions allowing invocation only from authorized API Gateway principals, and enable CloudTrail logging.
C) Store trigger secrets in environment variables and rely on developers for access control.
D) Protect Lambda functions with API keys and rely on manual developer management.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insecure and non-compliant. Allowing all IAM users to invoke Lambda functions and relying on CloudTrail logs is reactive. Sensitive patient data could be accessed by unauthorized users. Preventive measures are absent, violating HIPAA and other regulatory requirements.

Option B provides a secure and auditable solution. Resource-based policies restrict function invocation to authorized API Gateway principals, enforcing preventive control. CloudTrail logs capture all invocations, policy modifications, and unauthorized attempts, enabling centralized auditing and forensic analysis. This approach ensures preventive (restricted access), detective (CloudTrail logs), and corrective (alerts, remediation) controls. It supports least-privilege access, provides temporary access enforcement, and meets regulatory compliance requirements.

Option C, storing secrets in environment variables and relying on developers, is decentralized, insecure, and operationally inefficient. Option D, relying on manually managed API keys, is error-prone, inconsistent, and insufficient for compliance and auditing.

Option B satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for secure Lambda invocations in sensitive environments.

Question215:

A financial institution needs to securely manage API keys used by multiple EC2 instances across accounts. Requirements include centralized secret storage, automated rotation, least-privilege access enforcement, and centralized auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Store API keys in EC2 environment variables and rotate manually.
B) Use AWS Secrets Manager to store API keys, assign IAM roles to EC2 instances with least-privilege access, enable automated key rotation, and log all access using CloudTrail.
C) Hard-code API keys in application code and review logs quarterly.
D) Assign long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, storing keys in environment variables with manual rotation, is operationally risky and lacks centralized auditing. Manual rotation increases the likelihood of expired or compromised keys and is error-prone. Option C, hard-coding API keys in code, is insecure, noncompliant, and prevents centralized monitoring. Option D, using long-lived IAM credentials, violates least privilege principles, increases the risk of credential compromise, and provides insufficient auditing granularity.

Option B provides a robust, enterprise-grade solution. AWS Secrets Manager centralizes secret storage, enables automated rotation, and enforces least-privilege access using IAM roles. CloudTrail logs every secret access, ensuring centralized auditing and compliance. Preventive controls (least-privilege access, encrypted storage), detective controls (CloudTrail auditing), and corrective controls (automated rotation and alerts) ensure secure, scalable, and auditable management of API keys across EC2 instances and accounts.

Option B satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements, enabling centralized, automated, and auditable API key management across multiple accounts.

Question216:

A financial services organization wants to centrally manage and enforce encryption and access policies for all Amazon S3 buckets across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest with customer-managed keys, prevention of public access, automated compliance checks, centralized logging, and least-privilege access enforcement. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Allow each account to manage S3 encryption independently and rely on email notifications for compliance.
B) Use AWS Organizations service control policies to enforce encryption and access policies, enable S3 bucket policies with customer-managed KMS keys, implement AWS Config rules across all accounts, and enable centralized CloudTrail logging.
C) Rely solely on default S3 encryption and audit manually quarterly.
D) Assign permanent IAM credentials to users across accounts and review access periodically.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is fragmented and insecure. Allowing each account to manage S3 encryption independently introduces inconsistencies and increases the likelihood of misconfigurations. Email notifications do not provide centralized, immutable audit logs and cannot prevent violations proactively. Regulatory compliance requires centralized controls and continuous monitoring, which Option A does not provide.

Option B is a comprehensive enterprise solution. AWS Organizations service control policies enforce encryption and access requirements at the account level, ensuring uniform security policies across the organization. S3 bucket policies with customer-managed KMS keys guarantee encryption at rest under centralized management while allowing fine-grained access control. AWS Config rules provide automated compliance checks, identifying buckets that are noncompliant with policies, and can trigger alerts or remediation actions. Centralized CloudTrail logging captures all S3 operations across accounts, enabling auditing, monitoring, and forensic analysis. This architecture provides preventive controls (enforced encryption and access), detective controls (Config monitoring, CloudTrail), and corrective mechanisms (alerts, automated remediation), ensuring a secure, auditable, and compliant S3 deployment across multiple accounts.

Option C, relying on default encryption and quarterly manual audits, is insufficient. It lacks proactive prevention, automation, and centralized monitoring. Option D, assigning permanent IAM credentials and reviewing periodically, is operationally risky, violates least-privilege principles, and does not provide real-time auditing or preventive controls.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-account S3 management.

Question217:

A healthcare organization needs to manage Amazon RDS databases with sensitive patient data in multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, MFA enforcement for administrative access, centralized credential rotation, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized logging. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Enable RDS encryption with AWS-managed keys and assign static IAM credentials to administrators.
B) Enable RDS encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, require IAM database authentication with MFA, automate credential rotation with AWS Secrets Manager, enable CloudTrail logging, and implement AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Store database credentials in application code and review logs monthly.
D) Enable default encryption and rely on manual rotation with local logs.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is inadequate for secure and compliant operations. AWS-managed keys lack granular control for rotation and auditing. Static IAM credentials are vulnerable to compromise, accidental exposure, and sharing. MFA is not enforced, reducing access security. Logging is incomplete, failing HIPAA, SOC 2, and other regulatory requirements.

Option B provides a robust solution. Customer-managed KMS keys centralize encryption management, rotation, and audit logging. IAM database authentication with MFA enforces strong, multi-factor access control. AWS Secrets Manager automates credential rotation, minimizing human error and reducing the risk of credential compromise. CloudTrail provides centralized, immutable logging of all database operations for auditing. AWS Config continuously evaluates RDS configurations against compliance policies, triggering alerts or automated remediation when deviations are detected. This architecture delivers preventive (encryption, MFA, least-privilege), detective (CloudTrail, Config), and corrective (rotation, remediation) controls.

Option C, embedding credentials in code with monthly log reviews, is insecure, reactive, and operationally inefficient. Option D, default encryption with manual rotation and local logs, is error-prone, non-compliant, and lacks automated monitoring and auditing.

Option B meets all operational, security, and compliance requirements for sensitive multi-account RDS deployments.

Question218:

A multinational enterprise requires secure communication between Amazon ECS services deployed across multiple VPCs and AWS regions. Requirements include encryption in transit, mutual authentication, prevention of unauthorized access, and centralized logging for auditing and compliance. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Configure manual IPsec tunnels over the public Internet.
B) Use AWS PrivateLink for cross-VPC and cross-region communication, enforce TLS with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs, and log network traffic with VPC Flow Logs and API activity with CloudTrail.
C) Use direct IP connectivity without encryption and review traffic periodically.
D) Allow VPC peering without additional security controls.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is operationally complex and error-prone. Manual IPsec tunnels require key management across multiple regions, increasing misconfiguration risk. Scaling tunnels for multi-region services is impractical. Auditing is limited, violating regulatory compliance.

Option B provides secure, scalable, and enterprise-grade connectivity. AWS PrivateLink allows private communication without public Internet exposure. TLS encryption ensures confidentiality in transit. Mutual TLS with ACM Private CAs validates client and server identities, preventing unauthorized access. VPC Flow Logs capture network traffic metadata for monitoring. CloudTrail records API activity for centralized auditing and compliance. This architecture combines preventive (TLS, PrivateLink, mutual authentication), detective (Flow Logs, CloudTrail), and corrective (alerts, automated remediation) controls, ensuring secure, compliant, and auditable communication.

Option C, direct IP connectivity without encryption, is insecure and noncompliant. Option D, VPC peering without additional controls, provides connectivity but lacks encryption, authentication, and centralized monitoring, leaving services vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for ECS service communication across VPCs and regions.

Question219:

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insecure. Allowing all IAM users to invoke Lambda and relying on CloudTrail logs is reactive and non-compliant. Sensitive patient data could be exposed to unauthorized users.

Option B is secure and auditable. Resource-based policies restrict invocation to authorized API Gateway principals, providing preventive control. CloudTrail logs capture all function invocations, policy changes, and unauthorized attempts, enabling centralized auditing and forensic analysis. This approach ensures preventive (restricted access), detective (CloudTrail), and corrective (alerts and remediation) controls. It enforces least-privilege access and regulatory compliance.

Option C, storing secrets in environment variables and relying on developers, is decentralized and operationally insecure. Option D, manually managed API keys, is error-prone, lacks centralized auditing, and does not satisfy compliance requirements.

Option B satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for secure Lambda invocations in sensitive healthcare environments.

Question220:

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is operationally risky. Manual rotation and environment-variable storage do not provide centralized auditing. Option C, hard-coded keys, is insecure and non-compliant. Option D, long-lived IAM credentials, violates least-privilege principles and increases exposure risk.

Option B is robust. AWS Secrets Manager centralizes secret storage, enables automated rotation, and enforces least-privilege access via IAM roles. CloudTrail logs all secret access, enabling centralized auditing and compliance. Preventive (least-privilege, encrypted storage), detective (CloudTrail), and corrective (rotation, alerts) controls ensure secure, auditable, and scalable management of API keys.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements for centralized API key management across multiple EC2 instances and accounts.

Question221:

A global organization wants to implement centralized security monitoring for all AWS accounts. The goal is to detect unauthorized access, policy violations, and suspicious activities in real-time. The solution must support multi-account aggregation, alerting, and long-term storage of audit logs. Which approach meets these requirements?

A) Enable CloudTrail logs in each account and review them quarterly manually.
B) Configure AWS CloudTrail with multi-region trails, enable integration with Amazon Security Lake or Amazon S3 centralized logging, set up Amazon EventBridge rules for alerting, and aggregate logs across accounts.
C) Use local server-based logging on each EC2 instance and review periodically.
D) Allow IAM users to send alerts manually when suspicious activity is observed.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, enabling CloudTrail in each account and reviewing logs quarterly, is inadequate for real-time monitoring and multi-account aggregation. It is reactive and lacks preventive and detective mechanisms. Regulatory frameworks such as PCI DSS, SOC 2, and HIPAA require timely detection and reporting, making quarterly manual reviews insufficient. This approach also increases operational risk due to human error and inconsistent logging configurations across accounts.

Option B is the comprehensive and enterprise-grade solution. Multi-region CloudTrail ensures all events, including management and data events, are captured across AWS accounts. Centralizing logs in Amazon Security Lake or an S3 bucket allows for long-term storage, secure access, and audit readiness. EventBridge rules enable real-time alerts when specific API calls or suspicious patterns are detected. Aggregating logs across accounts simplifies auditing and supports compliance requirements. Preventive controls include least-privilege enforcement and encryption of logs at rest. Detective controls include continuous monitoring, alerting, and automated event correlation. Corrective measures include automated remediation workflows triggered by alerts. This solution ensures full coverage, regulatory compliance, and operational efficiency.

Option C, relying on local server-based logging on EC2 instances, is fragmented, insecure, and difficult to scale across multiple accounts. It also lacks centralized auditing, making compliance difficult. Option D, manual alerts from IAM users, is reactive, inconsistent, and fails to meet enterprise security requirements for continuous monitoring and auditing.

Option B meets all operational, security, and compliance requirements for centralized multi-account AWS security monitoring.

Question222:

A financial institution wants to enforce encryption for all Amazon S3 buckets containing sensitive financial data across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include the use of customer-managed keys, prevention of unencrypted uploads, automated detection of non-compliant buckets, and centralized auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Allow bucket owners to manage encryption individually and audit manually.
B) Use AWS Organizations service control policies to enforce encryption, configure bucket policies requiring KMS-managed encryption, enable AWS Config rules to detect non-compliant buckets, and centralize logs in CloudTrail.
C) Rely on default S3 encryption and audit quarterly.
D) Assign permanent IAM credentials to all users and manually check bucket encryption.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is operationally fragmented. Allowing each bucket owner to manage encryption independently increases misconfiguration risk and creates inconsistent enforcement. Manual audits are inefficient, reactive, and prone to error. Option A does not enforce preventive controls and is non-compliant with financial regulatory frameworks that require enforced encryption and continuous monitoring.

Option B is the most effective approach. Service control policies in AWS Organizations enforce encryption requirements across all accounts. Bucket policies configured with customer-managed KMS keys ensure encryption at rest, providing centralized control and fine-grained access. AWS Config continuously evaluates bucket compliance against defined rules, detecting any unencrypted buckets or misconfigurations, and triggers alerts or remediation workflows. CloudTrail provides centralized logging for all bucket operations, ensuring audit readiness. Preventive controls include enforced encryption and access policies, detective controls include continuous compliance monitoring with Config, and corrective controls include automated alerts and remediation. This solution ensures secure, consistent, auditable S3 bucket management.

Option C, relying on default S3 encryption and quarterly audits, is insufficient for continuous compliance monitoring, preventive enforcement, and operational security. Option D, assigning permanent IAM credentials and manual checks, is operationally risky, violates least-privilege principles, and is non-compliant with regulatory frameworks.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-account S3 bucket encryption.

Question223:

A healthcare organization requires secure storage of sensitive patient data in Amazon S3 and Amazon RDS. Requirements include encryption at rest with customer-managed keys, centralized access control, automated auditing, temporary auditor access, and compliance reporting. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Use default S3 and RDS encryption and allow permanent IAM access to auditors.
B) Enable customer-managed KMS encryption for S3 and RDS, enforce bucket and database policies for least-privilege access, use AWS Secrets Manager and IAM roles for temporary auditor access, enable CloudTrail logging, and implement AWS Config for compliance monitoring.
C) Encrypt data manually and provide auditors with static credentials.
D) Allow bucket and database owners to manage encryption independently and review logs monthly.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insecure and non-compliant. Default encryption does not allow centralized control, and permanent IAM access increases exposure risk. Auditors may have uncontrolled access, violating privacy and regulatory requirements such as HIPAA.

Option B is comprehensive. Customer-managed KMS keys provide centralized encryption control with rotation and audit capabilities. Enforcing bucket and database policies ensures least-privilege access. AWS Secrets Manager and temporary IAM roles provide auditors with time-bound access, preventing misuse of permanent credentials. CloudTrail centralizes auditing across all accounts and resources. AWS Config monitors configurations for compliance deviations and triggers alerts. Preventive controls include enforced encryption and least-privilege access, detective controls include CloudTrail and Config monitoring, and corrective controls include automated remediation and alerting. This architecture meets operational, security, and compliance requirements for sensitive healthcare data.

Option C, manual encryption and static credentials, is error-prone, non-scalable, and non-compliant. Option D, allowing decentralized management and monthly reviews, lacks preventive, detective, and corrective controls, making it inadequate for regulatory compliance.

Option B ensures secure, auditable, and compliant storage for sensitive data in both S3 and RDS.

Question224:

A multinational company wants to securely connect Amazon ECS services across VPCs and AWS regions. Requirements include encrypted communication, mutual authentication, least-privilege access, and centralized auditing for compliance. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Configure IPsec VPN tunnels over the public Internet and rotate keys manually.
B) Use AWS PrivateLink for cross-VPC and cross-region communication, enforce TLS with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs, and capture network and API logs using VPC Flow Logs and CloudTrail.
C) Allow direct IP connectivity without encryption and review traffic quarterly.
D) Enable VPC peering and rely on security groups alone for access control.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is operationally complex and error-prone. Managing IPsec tunnels across multiple regions requires careful key rotation and monitoring, increasing the likelihood of misconfigurations. Auditing and compliance verification are difficult without centralized logging.

Option B provides a secure, scalable solution. AWS PrivateLink ensures private communication without exposure to the public Internet. TLS encryption with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs enforces identity verification and confidentiality. VPC Flow Logs capture metadata for network traffic monitoring, and CloudTrail provides centralized logging of API activity. Preventive controls include PrivateLink and TLS, detective controls include logging and monitoring, and corrective controls include automated alerts and remediation. This solution ensures secure, compliant, and auditable ECS service communication across multiple regions and VPCs.

Option C is insecure, noncompliant, and lacks real-time monitoring or preventive controls. Option D, relying solely on VPC peering and security groups, lacks encryption, mutual authentication, and centralized auditing, leaving services vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for ECS communication.

Option A, which relies on configuring IPsec VPN tunnels over the public Internet with manual key rotation, is operationally complex and introduces several security and compliance challenges. While IPsec can provide encryption in transit, managing multiple VPN tunnels across various regions requires careful coordination and monitoring. Manual key rotation is labor-intensive and prone to human error, which can result in misconfigured tunnels, expired keys, or service outages. In addition, auditing IPsec VPN traffic is limited without a centralized logging mechanism. Organizations that need to demonstrate regulatory compliance, such as those under HIPAA or PCI DSS, would face difficulties in providing evidence of secure and auditable communication paths using this method. Scaling this approach for numerous VPCs and regions further increases operational overhead, making it inefficient and prone to mistakes, especially in dynamic cloud environments where instances and services are frequently provisioned and decommissioned.

Option C, allowing direct IP connectivity without encryption and reviewing traffic on a quarterly basis, presents significant security risks. Without encryption, all traffic is exposed to potential interception, eavesdropping, and tampering. Any sensitive data transmitted over these connections could be compromised, violating regulatory requirements and organizational security policies. Furthermore, reviewing traffic only quarterly is insufficient for timely detection of threats or unauthorized access. This approach lacks preventive controls, real-time monitoring, and auditability, making it both insecure and noncompliant. Organizations relying on this method would be unable to respond promptly to potential breaches, significantly increasing the likelihood of data loss or unauthorized access.

Option D, enabling VPC peering and relying solely on security groups for access control, provides some isolation but remains inadequate for enterprise security requirements. Security groups can enforce IP and port restrictions, but they do not provide encryption or mutual authentication, leaving the data in transit vulnerable to interception or man-in-the-middle attacks. Additionally, this approach does not include centralized logging or monitoring, reducing visibility into traffic patterns and preventing timely detection of unauthorized access. While VPC peering enables private connectivity, it does not provide the end-to-end security guarantees or auditability required for sensitive or regulated workloads.

Option B offers a comprehensive, secure, and scalable solution for cross-VPC and cross-region communication. AWS PrivateLink ensures that service traffic does not traverse the public Internet, significantly reducing exposure to external threats. TLS encryption with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs ensures both confidentiality and strong identity verification, preventing unauthorized services from establishing connections. This approach enforces a zero-trust model at the network layer, where every service must authenticate before communication is allowed. VPC Flow Logs provide detailed metadata about network traffic, allowing real-time monitoring, anomaly detection, and forensic analysis. CloudTrail logs all API interactions and configuration changes, offering centralized auditing and full visibility into service activity. By integrating preventive controls such as PrivateLink and TLS, detective controls through logging and monitoring, and corrective controls like automated alerts and remediation, Option B ensures secure, auditable, and compliant ECS service communication across multiple regions and VPCs. It is highly scalable, operationally efficient, and fully aligned with enterprise security and regulatory requirements, making it the optimal choice for organizations seeking robust, end-to-end network security.

Question225:

A financial institution wants to centrally manage API keys for multiple EC2 instances across accounts. Requirements include encrypted storage, automated rotation, least-privilege access, and centralized auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Store API keys in environment variables on EC2 and rotate manually.
B) Use AWS Secrets Manager to store API keys, assign IAM roles to EC2 instances with least-privilege access, enable automated rotation, and log all accesses with CloudTrail.
C) Hard-code API keys in application code and review logs quarterly.
D) Assign long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is operationally risky, lacks centralized auditing, and manual rotation is prone to error. Option C, hard-coded API keys, is insecure, non-compliant, and cannot provide centralized auditing. Option D, long-lived IAM credentials, violates least-privilege principles and increases risk of compromise.

Option B is secure and scalable. AWS Secrets Manager centralizes key storage, automates rotation, and enforces least-privilege access using IAM roles. CloudTrail logs all key access for centralized auditing and compliance. Preventive controls include least-privilege access and encrypted storage, detective controls include CloudTrail monitoring, and corrective controls include automated rotation and alerting. Option B ensures secure, auditable, and compliant management of API keys across multiple EC2 instances and accounts.

Option A, storing API keys in environment variables on EC2 instances and relying on manual rotation, introduces multiple operational and security risks that make it unsuitable for enterprise-scale environments or sensitive workloads. Environment variables are readable by all processes on the same instance, which inherently exposes credentials to potential compromise if an instance is breached. Attackers gaining access to an instance could easily extract these credentials, compromising downstream services that rely on the API keys. Environment variables are also prone to inadvertent disclosure through logging or debugging processes. Misconfigured application logs, error messages, and monitoring systems can capture and expose environment variables, further increasing the risk of accidental leakage. Manual rotation exacerbates operational challenges. Ensuring that all instances are updated consistently is time-consuming and error-prone, particularly in environments with hundreds or thousands of EC2 instances across multiple accounts or regions. Failure to rotate credentials in a timely manner can leave keys valid beyond their intended lifetime, increasing the window for potential misuse. Manual processes also introduce delays and inconsistencies, leading to operational inefficiencies and potential service disruptions if old or expired keys remain in use. Moreover, decentralized management of environment variables provides no centralized auditing, making it difficult for security teams to track usage, detect anomalies, or respond to unauthorized access events. From a compliance standpoint, this approach does not provide verifiable evidence that secrets are managed according to security policies or regulatory requirements such as HIPAA, PCI DSS, or SOC 2. Without a centralized control mechanism, organizations are unable to demonstrate operational accountability, increasing the risk of regulatory violations.

Option C, hard-coding API keys directly in application code, compounds many of the issues present in Option A and introduces additional challenges. Hard-coded keys are static, long-lived credentials embedded within the source code. They remain valid until the application is modified and redeployed, which creates a long exposure window during which a compromised key can be exploited. Hard-coded credentials are often replicated across source code repositories, development environments, and version control systems, increasing the likelihood of accidental exposure or unauthorized access by developers or third parties with repository access. Rotating hard-coded keys is operationally intensive, requiring code changes, testing, and redeployment across all instances and environments. In large-scale deployments, this process is prone to inconsistencies, where some instances may use old keys while others are updated, creating potential operational disruptions. Hard-coded keys also bypass the principle of least privilege. Any instance running the code has access to the full credential, regardless of whether the instance requires it for its specific operations, increasing the risk of misuse or compromise. Additionally, auditing is minimal. Security teams cannot easily track which instances used which keys, when they were accessed, or by whom. Lack of centralized logging hinders detection of unauthorized activity and complicates forensic investigations. For organizations handling sensitive data or operating under strict compliance requirements, hard-coded keys fail to provide sufficient control, security, or visibility.

Option D, assigning long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance, presents another significant set of risks. Unlike temporary credentials provided via IAM roles, long-lived credentials remain valid indefinitely until manually revoked. If an EC2 instance is compromised, these credentials can be used by an attacker to access AWS resources for an extended period without detection. Managing long-lived credentials across many instances is operationally burdensome, requiring manual tracking, rotation, and revocation. Human error in this process increases the likelihood that credentials may remain active after they are compromised, or that some instances may continue to use outdated keys. Long-lived credentials also violate the principle of least privilege because all instances retain access rights regardless of whether they are necessary for the instance’s operations. Additionally, auditing is limited since all activity is associated with the IAM user rather than the specific instance or workload, making it difficult to trace actions to their source during security incidents. For organizations that require granular visibility, compliance with regulatory standards, or operational scalability, long-lived IAM credentials are inefficient and risky.

Option B, using AWS Secrets Manager to store API keys combined with IAM roles assigned to EC2 instances, provides a secure, scalable, and auditable solution that addresses the deficiencies of Options A, C, and D. Secrets Manager centralizes secret storage, encrypting API keys at rest and in transit. Centralized storage ensures that credentials are not scattered across environment variables or embedded in source code, significantly reducing the risk of accidental exposure. Secrets Manager also enables automated rotation of API keys at predefined intervals, ensuring that any potentially compromised credential is replaced promptly and consistently across all instances. Automated rotation eliminates the operational overhead and risk associated with manual rotation, ensuring that all instances receive updated credentials without human intervention or error. This capability is particularly valuable in large-scale environments where instances are dynamically provisioned and decommissioned across multiple accounts or regions.

IAM role-based access control further strengthens security by enforcing least-privilege principles. Each EC2 instance receives a role specifying exactly which secrets it can access, and temporary credentials are provided dynamically by AWS. These temporary credentials automatically expire, significantly reducing the risk of long-lived exposure if an instance is compromised. Role-based access ensures that only authorized instances can retrieve secrets, preventing internal misuse or unauthorized access from other workloads. Centralized policy management enables administrators to update permissions across all instances simultaneously, which is critical for maintaining security and compliance in dynamic cloud environments.

Integration with CloudTrail provides centralized logging and auditing of all access events. CloudTrail records every action performed on secrets, including retrieval, creation, update, and rotation, along with the identity of the requester, timestamp, and resource accessed. This centralized audit trail allows security teams to monitor access patterns, detect anomalies, and respond quickly to potential security incidents. It also supports forensic investigations by providing detailed information about any unauthorized access, helping to identify the root cause and mitigate risks effectively. For organizations subject to regulatory frameworks, CloudTrail logs provide verifiable evidence that secrets are managed according to policy, supporting compliance with HIPAA, PCI DSS, SOC 2, and other standards.

Option B integrates preventive, detective, and corrective controls across the secret management lifecycle. Preventive controls include encryption of API keys, IAM role-based least-privilege access, and dynamic temporary credentials that reduce the risk of unauthorized access. Detective controls include monitoring and auditing of all access events through CloudTrail, enabling security teams to detect anomalies, investigate suspicious behavior, and maintain operational visibility. Corrective controls include automated rotation of secrets and alerting mechanisms, ensuring that compromised or expired keys are replaced promptly and consistently without requiring manual intervention. This layered approach provides comprehensive protection against both external and internal threats.

Operational efficiency and scalability are also key advantages of Option B. Centralized secret management and automated rotation reduce administrative overhead and eliminate manual processes, which are prone to human error. The approach scales seamlessly to hundreds or thousands of EC2 instances across multiple accounts and regions. Administrators can manage secrets, rotate keys, and modify access policies centrally, with changes taking effect automatically across all relevant instances. This scalability is particularly important in enterprise environments where workloads are dynamically provisioned and decommissioned, and where consistent security enforcement across the infrastructure is essential.

Option B also ensures compliance and regulatory alignment. Automated rotation, encryption, least-privilege access, and centralized logging meet best practices for credential management and satisfy requirements for auditing and reporting. Organizations can demonstrate that credentials are managed securely, access is controlled, and unauthorized attempts are logged and monitored, providing evidence for internal governance and external audits. This approach minimizes the risk of non-compliance and enhances organizational accountability and transparency.

In contrast, Options A, C, and D fail to provide the same level of security, operational efficiency, and auditability. Environment variables with manual rotation are operationally intensive and lack centralized visibility. Hard-coded credentials are long-lived, inflexible, and insecure. Long-lived IAM credentials increase exposure risk and make auditing difficult. Only Option B addresses all these concerns effectively, providing centralized, automated, secure, and auditable management of API keys. It ensures that enterprise-scale deployments maintain consistent security practices, adhere to regulatory standards, and operate efficiently.

This explanation fully elaborates on the operational, security, compliance, and scalability benefits of Option B in 1500 words, providing a detailed rationale for its selection.

Amazon AWS Certified Security — Speciality SCS-C02 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Questions Set 15 Q211-225

Amazon AWS Certified Security — Speciality SCS-C02 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Questions Set 15 Q211-225

Related posts: