Amazon AWS Certified Security — Speciality SCS-C02 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Questions Set 14 Q196-210

Amazon AWS Certified Security — Speciality SCS-C02 Exam Dumps and Practice Test Questions Set 14 Q196-210

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Question196:

A multinational financial institution wants to securely manage multi-region Amazon S3 buckets containing confidential trading data. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, strict prevention of public access, centralized key management, time-limited access for auditors, automated compliance checks, and centralized logging for auditing across all regions. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Share data using public S3 URLs and track access via email.
B) Enable S3 encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, apply bucket policies to block public access, provide pre-signed URLs for auditors with expiration, enable CloudTrail for cross-region logging, and implement AWS Config rules to monitor compliance continuously.
C) Encrypt files manually and share via FTP, logging activity locally.
D) Use default S3 encryption and assign permanent IAM credentials to auditors.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, sharing data publicly and tracking access via email, is insecure, non-compliant, and operationally fragile. Public URLs are easily exposed and cannot enforce access restrictions or auditing. Email is not a reliable or centralized audit mechanism. This approach violates regulatory frameworks like PCI DSS and GDPR, as it does not prevent unauthorized access, provide centralized logging, or ensure proper control over sensitive financial data.

Option B provides a comprehensive enterprise-grade solution. Customer-managed KMS keys enable centralized key management, detailed auditing of key usage, and encryption at rest. Bucket policies enforce preventive controls by denying public access. Pre-signed URLs provide time-limited access to auditors, enforcing least privilege and minimizing exposure. CloudTrail logs every S3 operation across regions, providing centralized auditing and forensic analysis. AWS Config continuously evaluates bucket configurations against compliance rules, providing automated detection of misconfigurations. Preventive controls (enforced encryption, access restrictions), detective controls (CloudTrail and Config monitoring), and corrective actions (alerts and remediation workflows) ensure secure, auditable, and compliant management of sensitive data.

Option C, manual encryption with FTP sharing, is operationally inefficient, error-prone, and lacks centralized auditing. Option D, default encryption with permanent IAM credentials, introduces operational risk, violates least privilege, and lacks automated compliance monitoring and time-limited access.

Option B fulfills all operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-region S3 buckets containing highly sensitive financial data.

Question197:

A healthcare organization needs to securely deploy Amazon RDS databases containing sensitive patient health information across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, restricted administrative access with MFA, centralized credential rotation, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized logging for auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Enable RDS encryption with AWS-managed keys and assign static IAM credentials to administrators.
B) Enable RDS encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, enforce IAM database authentication with MFA, automate credential rotation with AWS Secrets Manager, enable CloudTrail logging, and configure AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Store credentials in application code and perform monthly log reviews.
D) Enable default encryption and rely on manual rotation and local logs.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, using AWS-managed keys with static IAM credentials, lacks granular control over encryption keys, does not enforce MFA, and introduces operational risk. Static credentials are prone to compromise, and centralized auditing is insufficient, failing to meet HIPAA or other regulatory requirements.

Option B provides a robust enterprise solution. Customer-managed KMS keys allow centralized encryption at rest, auditability, and key rotation. IAM database authentication with MFA enforces strong identity verification for administrative users, implementing least-privilege access. Automated credential rotation via AWS Secrets Manager reduces operational errors, maintains secure access, and ensures regulatory compliance. CloudTrail logs all database operations, supporting auditing and forensic investigations, while AWS Config continuously monitors database configurations for compliance violations, enabling automated remediation. Preventive controls (enforced encryption, MFA, restricted access), detective controls (CloudTrail and Config monitoring), and corrective actions (automated credential rotation and alerts) provide a secure, scalable, and compliant multi-account RDS environment.

Option C, storing credentials in code and performing monthly log reviews, is operationally insecure, error-prone, and reactive. Option D, default encryption with manual rotation and local logging, is inadequate for compliance, operational efficiency, and risk mitigation.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and regulatory requirements, enabling secure management of sensitive patient data in multi-account RDS instances.

Question198:

A multinational enterprise requires secure inter-service communication between Amazon ECS services deployed across multiple VPCs and AWS regions. Requirements include encryption in transit, mutual authentication, prevention of unauthorized access, and centralized logging for audit and compliance purposes. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Configure manual IPsec tunnels over the public Internet between services.
B) Use AWS PrivateLink for cross-VPC and cross-region communication, enforce TLS with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs, and log network traffic with VPC Flow Logs and API activity with CloudTrail.
C) Use direct IP connectivity without encryption and review traffic periodically.
D) Allow VPC peering between all services without additional security controls.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, manually configuring IPsec tunnels over the Internet, is operationally complex, error-prone, and difficult to scale. Key distribution, rotation, and misconfiguration risks are high, and auditing is reactive, insufficient for compliance with GDPR, PCI DSS, or HIPAA.

Option B provides a scalable, secure, enterprise-grade solution. AWS PrivateLink offers private connectivity, preventing exposure to the public Internet. TLS encryption ensures secure data transmission, while mutual TLS authentication via ACM Private CAs validates identities of both client and server services, enforcing preventive controls. VPC Flow Logs capture network traffic metadata, and CloudTrail logs API activity for centralized auditing and forensic analysis. This solution integrates preventive, detective, and corrective controls, providing a secure, auditable, and compliant inter-service communication framework suitable for multinational deployments.

Option C, direct IP connectivity without encryption, exposes data to interception and does not satisfy compliance requirements. Option D, VPC peering without security controls, lacks authentication, encryption, and centralized auditing, leaving communication vulnerable to internal and external threats.

Option B fulfills all security, operational, and compliance requirements, ensuring secure, authenticated, encrypted, and auditable inter-service communication.

Question199:

A healthcare organization is deploying AWS Lambda functions that process sensitive patient data. Requirements include preventing unauthorized invocations, restricting triggers to authorized API Gateway endpoints, and auditing all invocations. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Allow all IAM users to invoke Lambda and rely on CloudTrail for auditing.
B) Apply resource-based policies to Lambda functions allowing invocation only from authorized API Gateway principals and enable CloudTrail logging.
C) Store trigger secrets in environment variables and rely on developers for access control.
D) Protect Lambda functions with API keys and rely on manual developer management.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, allowing all IAM users to invoke Lambda and relying solely on CloudTrail logs, is insecure and reactive. Unauthorized access or accidental invocations may expose sensitive patient data. Logging alone does not prevent access violations or provide real-time enforcement.

Option B provides a secure, auditable solution. Resource-based policies enforce preventive controls by restricting invocation to authorized API Gateway principals. CloudTrail provides centralized logging for every function invocation, policy change, or unauthorized attempt, enabling compliance reporting, forensic analysis, and operational visibility. This approach integrates preventive, detective, and corrective controls, ensuring secure, auditable Lambda invocation.

Option C, storing secrets in environment variables, is operationally insecure, lacks centralized access control, and cannot prevent unauthorized invocations. Option D, relying on API keys managed manually by developers, is error-prone, inconsistent, and insufficient for compliance.

Option B meets operational, security, and compliance requirements, providing secure, auditable Lambda function invocation for sensitive healthcare workloads.

Question200:

A financial institution needs to securely manage API keys used by multiple EC2 instances across accounts. Requirements include centralized secret storage, automated rotation, least-privilege access enforcement, and centralized auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Store API keys in EC2 environment variables and rotate manually.
B) Use AWS Secrets Manager to store API keys, assign IAM roles to EC2 instances with least-privilege access, enable automated key rotation, and log all access using CloudTrail.
C) Hard-code API keys in application code and review logs quarterly.
D) Assign long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, storing API keys in environment variables with manual rotation, is operationally risky, error-prone, and difficult to audit. Manual rotation increases the likelihood of expired or compromised keys, lacks central visibility, and does not support compliance reporting.

Option B offers a robust, enterprise-grade solution. AWS Secrets Manager centralizes secret storage, enables automated rotation, and enforces strict access control via IAM roles. Assigning least-privilege IAM roles ensures EC2 instances only access necessary secrets. CloudTrail logs every secret access event, providing centralized auditing, compliance monitoring, and forensic analysis. Preventive controls (least-privilege access, encrypted secrets), detective controls (CloudTrail auditing), and corrective controls (automated rotation and alerts) ensure secure, scalable, and auditable management of API keys across multiple EC2 instances and accounts.

Option C, hard-coding keys in application code, is insecure, lacks central management, and does not provide auditability. Option D, assigning long-lived IAM credentials, violates least-privilege principles, increases operational risk, and limits auditing granularity.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements, providing centralized, automated, and auditable management of sensitive API keys for EC2 instances.

Question201:

A global bank wants to securely store highly confidential financial documents in Amazon S3 across multiple AWS accounts and regions. The requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, strict prevention of public access, centralized key management, time-limited access for external auditors, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized auditing of all operations. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Share S3 objects via public URLs and track access through email notifications.
B) Enable S3 encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, enforce bucket policies to block public access, provide pre-signed URLs for auditors with expiration, enable CloudTrail logging across all regions, and implement AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Encrypt files manually and share via FTP, with local log reviews monthly.
D) Enable default S3 encryption and provide permanent IAM credentials to auditors.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is highly insecure and non-compliant. Public S3 URLs can be accidentally exposed or maliciously accessed. Email tracking provides no centralized or immutable audit trail, and access control cannot be reliably enforced. Regulatory frameworks such as PCI DSS, SOX, and GDPR require strong preventive and detective controls, which are absent here.

Option B offers a fully compliant and enterprise-grade solution. Customer-managed KMS keys provide centralized key control, including key rotation, detailed usage auditing, and fine-grained access policies. Bucket policies prevent unintended public access, providing preventive control. Pre-signed URLs allow auditors temporary, least-privilege access without permanent credentials. CloudTrail records all S3 operations for centralized auditing across regions. AWS Config continuously evaluates bucket configurations for compliance violations, allowing automated remediation and alerting. This combination addresses preventive controls (enforced encryption, restricted access), detective controls (CloudTrail and Config monitoring), and corrective controls (alerts and automated remediation), ensuring secure, compliant, and auditable storage of sensitive financial data.

Option C, manual encryption and FTP sharing, is operationally inefficient, error-prone, and lacks centralized auditing, making it unsuitable for regulatory compliance. Option D, default encryption with permanent IAM credentials, introduces operational risk, violates the principle of least privilege, and does not provide automated compliance monitoring or time-limited access.

Therefore, Option B satisfies all security, operational, and compliance requirements for multi-region S3 buckets storing highly confidential financial documents.

Question202:

A healthcare organization is deploying Amazon RDS databases containing sensitive patient health records across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, administrative access restricted with MFA, centralized credential rotation, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized logging for auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Enable RDS encryption with AWS-managed keys and assign static IAM credentials to administrators.
B) Enable RDS encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, require IAM database authentication with MFA for administrators, rotate credentials automatically using AWS Secrets Manager, enable CloudTrail logging, and implement AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Store credentials in application code and review logs monthly.
D) Enable default encryption and rely on manual credential rotation with local logs.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insufficient because AWS-managed keys provide limited control over key rotation and auditing, and static IAM credentials for administrators are prone to compromise. This approach does not enforce MFA or provide robust audit trails, making it unsuitable for HIPAA or other regulatory compliance.

Option B offers a comprehensive solution. Customer-managed KMS keys enable centralized encryption management, auditability, and automated rotation. IAM database authentication with MFA ensures that administrators are verified with strong identity controls, enforcing least privilege. AWS Secrets Manager automates credential rotation, reducing operational errors and exposure risk. CloudTrail captures all RDS operations, providing a centralized audit trail for compliance and forensic investigation. AWS Config continuously monitors database configurations, enabling automated compliance checks and corrective actions. This architecture integrates preventive controls (enforced encryption, MFA, least privilege), detective controls (CloudTrail, Config monitoring), and corrective controls (automated rotation, remediation), ensuring secure, compliant, and auditable database operations.

Option C, embedding credentials in code with monthly log reviews, is insecure, lacks centralized control, and is reactive rather than proactive. Option D, relying on default encryption with manual rotation and local logs, is operationally inefficient, error-prone, and does not meet compliance standards.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and regulatory requirements for multi-account, sensitive healthcare data deployments in Amazon RDS.

Question203:

A multinational enterprise requires secure communication between Amazon ECS services deployed in multiple VPCs and AWS regions. Requirements include encryption in transit, mutual authentication, prevention of unauthorized access, and centralized logging for audit and compliance. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Configure manual IPsec tunnels over the public Internet between services.
B) Use AWS PrivateLink for cross-VPC and cross-region communication, enforce TLS with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs, and log all network traffic with VPC Flow Logs and API activity with CloudTrail.
C) Use direct IP connectivity without encryption and review traffic periodically.
D) Allow VPC peering between all services without additional security controls.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, configuring IPsec tunnels manually, is operationally complex and error-prone. Key distribution, rotation, and configuration errors can expose data. Auditing is limited and reactive, insufficient for compliance with standards such as PCI DSS, HIPAA, or GDPR. Scaling this approach across multiple regions is operationally difficult.

Option B is a scalable, secure, and enterprise-grade solution. AWS PrivateLink provides private connectivity without exposing data to the Internet. TLS ensures encryption in transit, and mutual authentication via ACM Private CAs validates both client and server identities, preventing unauthorized access. VPC Flow Logs capture network traffic metadata for monitoring, and CloudTrail records API activity for centralized auditing and forensic capabilities. Preventive controls (enforced mutual TLS, PrivateLink), detective controls (Flow Logs and CloudTrail auditing), and corrective controls (alerts, automated remediation) ensure operational security, compliance, and auditability. This approach reduces operational complexity while providing strong security guarantees for multinational deployments.

Option C, direct IP connectivity without encryption, is insecure, noncompliant, and lacks auditing. Option D, VPC peering without security controls, provides connectivity but no authentication, encryption, or centralized logging, leaving communication vulnerable to threats.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements for secure, authenticated, encrypted, and auditable inter-service communication.

Question204:

A healthcare organization is deploying AWS Lambda functions that process sensitive patient data. Requirements include preventing unauthorized invocation, restricting triggers to authorized API Gateway endpoints, and auditing all function invocations. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Allow all IAM users to invoke Lambda and rely on CloudTrail logs.
B) Apply resource-based policies to Lambda functions, allowing invocation only from authorized API Gateway principals, and enable CloudTrail logging.
C) Store trigger secrets in environment variables and rely on developers to manage access.
D) Protect Lambda functions with API keys and rely on manual developer management.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, allowing all IAM users to invoke Lambda and relying solely on CloudTrail logs, is insecure and reactive. Unauthorized or accidental invocations could expose sensitive data, and logs alone do not prevent or alert on security violations.

Option B provides a secure, auditable, and compliant solution. Resource-based policies enforce preventive controls by restricting invocation to authorized API Gateway principals. CloudTrail logging captures every invocation, policy change, and unauthorized attempt, providing centralized auditing and forensic capabilities. This solution combines preventive controls (restricted access), detective controls (CloudTrail auditing), and corrective actions (alerts and automated remediation), ensuring secure, auditable Lambda function usage.

Option C, storing secrets in environment variables, is operationally insecure, lacks centralized access control, and does not prevent unauthorized invocations. Option D, relying on manually managed API keys, is error-prone and inconsistent, unsuitable for regulatory compliance.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements for secure, auditable Lambda function invocations processing sensitive healthcare workloads.

Question205:

A financial institution needs to securely manage API keys used by multiple EC2 instances across accounts. Requirements include centralized secret storage, automated rotation, least-privilege access enforcement, and centralized auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Store API keys in EC2 environment variables and rotate manually.
B) Use AWS Secrets Manager to store API keys, assign IAM roles to EC2 instances with least-privilege access, enable automated key rotation, and log all access using CloudTrail.
C) Hard-code API keys in application code and review logs quarterly.
D) Assign long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, storing API keys in environment variables and manually rotating, is operationally risky, error-prone, and difficult to audit. Manual rotation increases the likelihood of expired or compromised keys and lacks centralized visibility.

Option B provides a robust, enterprise-grade solution. AWS Secrets Manager centralizes secret storage, enables automated rotation, and enforces strict access control via IAM roles. Assigning least-privilege IAM roles ensures EC2 instances only access secrets required for operation. CloudTrail logs every secret access event, providing centralized auditing, compliance reporting, and forensic capabilities. Preventive controls (least-privilege access, encrypted secrets), detective controls (CloudTrail auditing), and corrective controls (automated rotation and alerts) ensure secure, scalable, and auditable management of API keys.

Option C, hard-coding API keys in application code, is operationally insecure, lacks central management, and provides insufficient auditing. Option D, assigning long-lived IAM credentials, violates least-privilege principles, increases operational risk, and limits auditing granularity.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements, enabling centralized, automated, and auditable management of sensitive API keys across EC2 instances and accounts.

Question206:

A global bank wants to securely manage multi-region Amazon S3 buckets containing highly confidential customer data. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, prevention of public access, centralized key management, temporary access for external auditors, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized logging for auditing across all regions. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Share S3 objects using public URLs and track access via email notifications.
B) Enable S3 encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, enforce bucket policies to block public access, provide pre-signed URLs for auditors with expiration, enable CloudTrail logging across regions, and implement AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Encrypt files manually and share via FTP with monthly local log reviews.
D) Use default S3 encryption and assign permanent IAM credentials to auditors.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insecure and non-compliant. Sharing S3 objects via public URLs exposes sensitive data to unauthorized access. Public URLs can be easily intercepted or misused, and email notifications do not provide centralized audit trails or proper access control enforcement. Regulatory frameworks such as PCI DSS, SOX, and GDPR require preventive controls, such as strong encryption and strict access management, as well as detective controls like centralized logging and auditing. Option A fails to meet these requirements and exposes the bank to high operational and legal risks.

Option B provides a comprehensive, enterprise-grade solution. Using customer-managed KMS keys ensures that encryption at rest is centrally controlled, with the ability to manage key rotation, access policies, and usage auditing. Bucket policies enforce preventive measures by blocking public access and controlling which principals can access the bucket. Pre-signed URLs allow temporary, least-privilege access to auditors, meeting compliance requirements without exposing permanent credentials. CloudTrail logging across all regions ensures that every S3 operation is recorded for auditing, while AWS Config continuously monitors bucket configurations for compliance violations, providing automated alerts and potential remediation. This architecture integrates preventive controls (enforced encryption and access policies), detective controls (CloudTrail and Config monitoring), and corrective actions (alerts and automated remediation), ensuring secure, auditable, and compliant management of sensitive data.

Option C, manual encryption with FTP sharing and monthly log reviews, is operationally inefficient, prone to human error, and lacks real-time monitoring and auditing. This solution would fail most regulatory requirements due to delayed detection and absence of centralized management. Option D, relying on default S3 encryption with permanent IAM credentials for auditors, introduces unnecessary risk because permanent credentials can be misused, and it lacks automated compliance monitoring and temporary access controls.

Thus, Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-region S3 storage of highly sensitive financial data.

Question207:

A healthcare organization is deploying Amazon RDS databases containing sensitive patient health information across multiple AWS accounts. Requirements include encryption at rest and in transit, MFA enforcement for administrative access, centralized credential rotation, automated compliance monitoring, and centralized logging. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Enable RDS encryption with AWS-managed keys and assign static IAM credentials to administrators.
B) Enable RDS encryption with customer-managed KMS keys, require IAM database authentication with MFA, automate credential rotation using AWS Secrets Manager, enable CloudTrail logging, and implement AWS Config rules for continuous compliance monitoring.
C) Store credentials in application code and review logs monthly.
D) Enable default encryption and rely on manual rotation with local logs.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is inadequate for regulatory and security requirements. AWS-managed keys provide encryption but do not offer granular control over rotation and auditing. Assigning static IAM credentials to administrators increases the risk of credential compromise, as these credentials may be shared, lost, or exposed, and MFA is not enforced, failing to provide a second authentication factor. Logging may also be incomplete, limiting auditing capabilities for compliance standards such as HIPAA.

Option B provides a holistic, enterprise-ready solution. Customer-managed KMS keys provide centralized control over encryption, including key rotation and detailed audit capabilities. IAM database authentication with MFA ensures that administrative access is validated using strong authentication and enforces least-privilege access. AWS Secrets Manager automates credential rotation, reducing operational errors and mitigating the risk of expired or compromised credentials. CloudTrail captures all RDS operations for centralized auditing, allowing detection of any unauthorized access attempts or policy violations. AWS Config continuously monitors database configurations, evaluating compliance against defined rules, and triggering alerts or automated remediation when violations occur. This architecture provides preventive controls (encryption, MFA, least-privilege), detective controls (CloudTrail and Config monitoring), and corrective mechanisms (automated rotation and remediation), ensuring secure, compliant, and auditable operations.

Option C, embedding credentials in code with monthly log reviews, is highly insecure, operationally risky, and lacks centralized management, monitoring, or enforcement, making it noncompliant. Option D, relying on default encryption with manual rotation and local logs, is operationally inefficient, error-prone, and insufficient for regulatory compliance, lacking automation and centralized auditing.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-account deployments of sensitive healthcare data in Amazon RDS.

Question208:

A multinational enterprise requires secure communication between Amazon ECS services deployed across multiple VPCs and AWS regions. Requirements include encryption in transit, mutual authentication, prevention of unauthorized access, and centralized logging for auditing and compliance. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Configure manual IPsec tunnels over the public Internet between services.
B) Use AWS PrivateLink for cross-VPC and cross-region communication, enforce TLS with mutual authentication using ACM Private CAs, and log network traffic with VPC Flow Logs and API activity with CloudTrail.
C) Use direct IP connectivity without encryption and review traffic periodically.
D) Allow VPC peering without additional security controls.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A, manual IPsec tunnels, introduces significant operational complexity. Configuring, rotating, and managing keys across multiple regions is prone to errors. Misconfigurations may expose sensitive data. Auditing is limited, making regulatory compliance difficult. Scaling manual IPsec tunnels for a global, multi-region deployment is operationally infeasible.

Option B provides a secure, scalable, and enterprise-grade solution. AWS PrivateLink enables private connectivity without exposing traffic to the public Internet. TLS encryption ensures data confidentiality in transit, and mutual TLS with ACM Private CAs validates both client and server identities, preventing unauthorized access. VPC Flow Logs capture metadata about network traffic for monitoring, while CloudTrail records API activity, providing centralized auditing and forensic capabilities. Preventive controls (PrivateLink, TLS, mutual authentication), detective controls (VPC Flow Logs, CloudTrail auditing), and corrective controls (automated alerts and remediation) ensure secure, compliant, and auditable inter-service communication. This architecture reduces operational complexity while providing robust security guarantees across multiple regions.

Option C, direct IP connectivity without encryption, is noncompliant and insecure. Option D, VPC peering without additional controls, provides connectivity but lacks encryption, authentication, and centralized logging, leaving services vulnerable to unauthorized access.

Option B fully satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for multi-region ECS service communication.

Question209:

A healthcare organization is deploying AWS Lambda functions to process sensitive patient data. Requirements include preventing unauthorized invocations, restricting triggers to authorized API Gateway endpoints, and auditing all invocations. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Allow all IAM users to invoke Lambda and rely on CloudTrail logs.
B) Apply resource-based policies to Lambda functions allowing invocation only from authorized API Gateway principals, and enable CloudTrail logging.
C) Store trigger secrets in environment variables and rely on developers for access control.
D) Protect Lambda functions with API keys and rely on manual developer management.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is insecure. Allowing all IAM users to invoke Lambda and relying on CloudTrail logs is reactive. Sensitive patient data could be accessed by unauthorized users, and logs alone do not prevent violations. Regulatory compliance frameworks require both preventive and detective controls.

Option B offers a robust, secure, and auditable solution. Resource-based policies restrict invocation to authorized API Gateway principals, providing preventive control. CloudTrail logs every invocation, policy change, and unauthorized attempt, enabling centralized auditing and forensic investigation. This approach combines preventive controls (restricted access), detective controls (logging), and corrective actions (alerts and remediation), ensuring compliance and data security.

Option C, storing secrets in environment variables, is operationally insecure, decentralized, and prone to accidental exposure. Option D, relying on manually managed API keys, is error-prone, lacks centralized auditing, and does not meet regulatory compliance requirements.

Option B satisfies operational, security, and compliance requirements for secure, auditable Lambda function invocations.

Question210:

A financial institution needs to securely manage API keys used by multiple EC2 instances across accounts. Requirements include centralized secret storage, automated rotation, least-privilege access enforcement, and centralized auditing. Which solution meets these requirements?

A) Store API keys in EC2 environment variables and rotate manually.
B) Use AWS Secrets Manager to store API keys, assign IAM roles to EC2 instances with least-privilege access, enable automated key rotation, and log all access using CloudTrail.
C) Hard-code API keys in application code and review logs quarterly.
D) Assign long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance.

Answer:
B

Explanation:

Option A is operationally risky and lacks centralized auditing. Manual rotation increases the likelihood of expired or exposed keys and is error-prone. Option C, hard-coding API keys, is insecure and cannot provide centralized monitoring. Option D, assigning long-lived IAM credentials, violates least privilege principles and reduces auditing granularity.

Option B is enterprise-ready and secure. AWS Secrets Manager centralizes secret storage, enables automated rotation, and enforces least-privilege access via IAM roles. CloudTrail logs every secret access, ensuring centralized auditing and forensic capabilities. Preventive controls (least-privilege access, encrypted storage), detective controls (CloudTrail auditing), and corrective controls (automated rotation and alerts) provide secure, scalable, and auditable API key management across EC2 instances and accounts.

Option B satisfies all operational, security, and compliance requirements for centralized, automated, and auditable management of sensitive API keys.

Option A, storing API keys in EC2 environment variables with manual rotation, presents significant security and operational challenges that make it unsuitable for enterprise-scale environments or for workloads handling sensitive data. While environment variables offer a convenient mechanism for applications to access configuration data and secrets, they are inherently insecure when used for sensitive credentials. Environment variables are typically readable by any process running on the same instance. This means that if an attacker gains access to an EC2 instance, they can easily retrieve any secrets stored in environment variables, creating a high potential for compromise. Additionally, environment variables are often exposed inadvertently through misconfigured logging, monitoring, or debugging tools. Application logs, system process snapshots, and error messages may all contain environment variable values if care is not taken to mask them, increasing the likelihood of unintentional disclosure. Moreover, manually rotating keys stored in environment variables requires administrative intervention, introducing human error and operational delays. In environments with hundreds or thousands of EC2 instances, coordinating manual rotation becomes exponentially complex, leading to inconsistencies where some instances use outdated keys while others have been updated. Such inconsistencies not only increase operational risk but also create potential service outages if instances fail to authenticate with expired keys. Furthermore, manual rotation and decentralized key management make auditing nearly impossible. Security teams have no centralized view of which keys are in use, which instances are accessing them, or whether any unauthorized access has occurred. For organizations required to comply with regulatory frameworks like HIPAA, PCI DSS, or SOC 2, these gaps in key management and auditability create compliance risks. Overall, while environment variables provide operational convenience, their lack of security controls, combined with the complexity of manual rotation and absence of centralized auditing, renders this approach inadequate for enterprise environments.

Option C, hard-coding API keys directly in application code, compounds many of the issues seen with environment variables and introduces additional risks. Hard-coded keys are static and long-lived, meaning that they remain valid until the code itself is modified and redeployed. This creates a significant exposure window during which a compromised key can be exploited, and any breach can have lasting operational consequences. Hard-coded keys also tend to be replicated across source code repositories, development environments, and testing frameworks, making it difficult to maintain strict access control. In collaborative development teams, the likelihood of inadvertent exposure increases, particularly if access to repositories is not tightly controlled. Additionally, the operational overhead for rotating hard-coded keys is substantial. Each update requires code modification, testing, and redeployment to every instance or environment that relies on the secret. In large-scale deployments, this process is time-consuming, error-prone, and difficult to coordinate, often resulting in inconsistencies where some instances continue to use outdated credentials. Hard-coded keys also bypass the principle of least privilege because any instance running the code has unrestricted access to the API key, regardless of whether it is necessary for its specific operations. From an auditing perspective, hard-coded keys provide minimal visibility. Security teams cannot track which instances accessed which keys, when, or for what purpose, making forensic investigations and regulatory reporting difficult. Consequently, hard-coding keys in application code is both operationally inefficient and insecure, and it fails to meet enterprise or regulatory standards for secret management.

Option D, assigning long-lived IAM credentials to each EC2 instance, introduces a different set of risks. Unlike temporary credentials issued via IAM roles, long-lived credentials remain valid indefinitely until manually revoked, leaving an extended attack window in the event of a compromise. If an EC2 instance is breached, the long-lived credentials can be exploited to access AWS resources without immediate detection, significantly increasing the potential impact of an incident. Managing these credentials across a large number of instances is operationally challenging. Each credential must be individually tracked, rotated, and revoked if compromised, leading to administrative overhead and increasing the chance of human error. Auditing is also limited because all activity is attributed to the IAM user associated with the credentials, rather than the specific instance or workload that performed the action. This lack of granularity hinders forensic investigations and complicates regulatory reporting. Long-lived credentials also violate the principle of least privilege, as every instance retains access rights that may exceed operational requirements, increasing the risk of misuse or accidental exposure. In summary, while assigning long-lived IAM credentials might seem operationally simple, it significantly compromises security, scalability, and auditability, making it an unsuitable solution for enterprise environments.

Option B, leveraging AWS Secrets Manager in combination with least-privilege IAM roles for EC2 instances, addresses all of the operational, security, and compliance limitations inherent in Options A, C, and D. AWS Secrets Manager provides centralized secret storage with encryption at rest and in transit, ensuring that API keys are protected from unauthorized access. Centralized management allows administrators to create, update, and revoke secrets from a single interface, eliminating the need to distribute credentials manually or embed them in code or environment variables. Automated key rotation further reduces operational overhead and exposure risk. By rotating credentials at predefined intervals, Secrets Manager ensures that even if a key is compromised, it cannot be exploited for an extended period. This automation removes human error from the rotation process, ensuring consistency and operational efficiency across potentially thousands of EC2 instances.

IAM role-based access control complements Secrets Manager by enforcing least-privilege principles. Each EC2 instance is assigned a role that specifies which secrets it can access and under what conditions. Temporary credentials provided by IAM roles eliminate the need for long-lived static keys, and they automatically expire, further reducing the risk of credential compromise. This approach also simplifies operational management, as administrators can modify access policies centrally, and the changes take effect immediately without requiring instance reconfiguration. Least-privilege IAM roles also minimize the potential impact of a compromised instance, as it can only access the secrets required for its operations, rather than any key stored on the system.

Centralized auditing and logging via CloudTrail is a critical component of Option B. Every action performed against Secrets Manager, including secret retrieval, creation, rotation, and deletion, is logged. CloudTrail captures details about the requester, timestamp, and resource involved, providing a complete audit trail. This enables security teams to detect anomalous access patterns, investigate potential security incidents, and maintain compliance with regulatory requirements. For organizations subject to HIPAA, PCI DSS, or SOC 2, the ability to demonstrate centralized auditing, automated rotation, and strict access control is essential. CloudTrail logs also facilitate forensic investigations in the event of an incident, allowing teams to determine whether API keys were accessed inappropriately and to respond quickly to mitigate potential damage.

Option B integrates preventive, detective, and corrective controls into a cohesive security framework. Preventive controls include encryption of secrets, least-privilege IAM access, and temporary credentials that minimize the risk of unauthorized use. Detective controls are implemented through CloudTrail logging, enabling continuous monitoring and anomaly detection. Corrective controls are provided by automated key rotation, which ensures that compromised credentials are replaced immediately without requiring manual intervention. Together, these controls provide comprehensive protection across the entire lifecycle of API keys, from creation to retirement.

Operational efficiency is another advantage of Option B. Centralized secret management and automated rotation eliminate the need for manual intervention, reducing administrative burden and operational risk. The architecture is highly scalable, supporting deployments with hundreds or thousands of EC2 instances across multiple accounts and regions. Administrators can apply policy changes centrally, and instances automatically receive updated permissions and secrets without requiring redeployment or configuration changes. This simplifies management and supports dynamic, large-scale environments where instances are frequently provisioned or decommissioned.

Option B also mitigates compliance and regulatory risks effectively. By enforcing encryption, automated rotation, least-privilege access, and centralized logging, organizations can demonstrate that they follow best practices for secret management. These capabilities align with industry standards and regulations, ensuring that sensitive credentials are handled securely and that evidence of compliance is readily available during audits.

In contrast to Options A, C, and D, Option B provides a comprehensive, secure, and scalable solution. Environment variables and manual rotation are operationally risky and difficult to audit. Hard-coded keys expose secrets to potential leakage and are cumbersome to rotate. Long-lived IAM credentials compromise security and complicate auditing. Option B addresses all these challenges, providing centralized, automated, and auditable management of API keys. It integrates preventive, detective, and corrective controls, supports enterprise-scale operations, and aligns with regulatory and security best practices.

It mitigates the risks of credential compromise, operational errors, and regulatory noncompliance while providing centralized management, automated rotation, and comprehensive auditability. Organizations adopting this approach can confidently manage sensitive API keys across multiple EC2 instances and accounts, ensuring robust security, operational efficiency, and regulatory compliance. Option B satisfies all enterprise requirements, making it the optimal choice for secure API key management.